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All Suffer the Affliction of the 
One: Metaphysical Holism and 
the Presence of the Spirit 
By Brad J. Kallenberg 
When Copernicus and Galileo proposed that the earth circled the sun and not the 217 
other way around, Christian believers faced the difficult prospect of surrendering a 
long-held belief that had seemingly undeniable support from the biblical text. Af-
ter all, Joshua reported that the sun, not the earth, stood still; what could this mean 
if not that the sun orbited the earth? Today, centuries later, believers unanimously 
hold a heliocentric view of the solar system and are somewhat embarrassed by the 
ignorance of our pre-Enlightenment brothers and sisters. Ironically, however, such 
embarrassment masks the possibility that we ourselves may one day be found guilty 
of having held notions yet to be realized as "backwards." 
We face just such a possibility with our conception of the Holy Spirit's pres-
ence. It is my suspicion that, contrary to some of our most trenchant modern sensi-
bilities, we are mistaken when we construe the presence of the Spirit in largely 
individualistic terms. Yet in this case, it is not the biblical text that is misleading. In 
contrast, a close inspection of the biblical record and of its earliest interpreters re-
Veals that the earliest Christians naturally tmderstood the presence of God's Spirit 
primarily in corporate rather than individualistic terms. 
The holism that marks first- and second-century conceptions of commw'li.ty 
life tends to strike our modern ears as a form of primitive hocus-pocus. However, 
Very recent discussions of" emergence" and "supervenience" in philosophical circles 
may provide us moderns with the conceptual resources necessary for better own-
ing the biblical record. In this paper, I will argue that biblical notions of the Spirit's 
"indwelling" and "filling" ought to be primarily understood as descriptive of the 
Spirit's relation to the believing community and perhaps only secondarily in rela-
Since the Enlightenment, systematic theologies have almost invariably described the Holy 
Spirit in terms of an interface between God and huma11 individuals qua individuals. Since the 
biblical text leans the other way, there are good reasons for seeking out better conceptual 
resolU·ces for understanding the presence of the Holy Spirit than can be offered by reductive 
theories of metaphysics that became so influential in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries. This paper surveys recent work in supervenience and emergentism in order to suggest 
Ways for recapturing a more holistic, which is to say more biblical, pneumatology. Brad J. 
l<aUenberg is Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Dayton. 
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218 tion to believing individuals. I begin by examining the biblical texts and the witness 
of the second-century apologists. I then proceed to summarize philosophical dis-
cussions regarding emergence and supervenience. I end with a suggestion that we 
can recover the biblical sense more fully by appropriating the language of emer-
gence and supervenience: (1) the Body of Christ emerges from the system of indi-
viduals living under a particular form of life; and thal (2) descriptions of the Holy 
Spirit's presence supervenes upon descriptions of this particular form of communal 
living. 
Holism in the Biblical Text 
Paul writes to the motley group of believers in Corinth that "there are many 
members, yet one body." Moreover, God has so arranged this body that "if one 
member suffers, all suffer together with it ... " 1 It is difficult to convey the strength 
with which Paul writes this last sentence. He does not say that members of a believ-
ing community ought to suffer with one of their afflicted members, or that the afflic-
tion of the one is grounds for empathy and sacrificial care. Ratl1er, he uses an indica-
tive verb to express a fact: all suffer the affliction of the one. Paul's language is clear on 
this point: the body of Christ is so constituted that no individual member canes-
cape affecting or being affected by the condition of the rest.2 
Now, I am puzzled by this, not by Paul's view of the body, but by the curious 
fact that contemporary believers who take biblical texts very seriously display a 
consistent tendency to conceive the action of God's Spirit in individualistic terms. 
To cite but one example, Millard Erickson construes the corporate action of the Holy 
Spirit as exhausted by the piecemeal distribution of spiritual gifts to individuals. 
Erickson consistently emphasizes the primacy of the Holy Spirit's action toward 
individuals: "The work of the Holy Spirit is of special interest to Christians, for it is 
particularly through this work that God is personally involved and active in the life 
of the believer."3 In Erickson's eyes, the Holy Spirit initiates the individual into the 
Christian life by playing the dominant role both in conversion, which he calls "the 
individual's turning to God," and regeneration, which he defines as "the miraculous 
transformation of the individual and implantation of spiritual energy."4 
11 Cor. 12:20, 26, NRSV. 
2Stanley Hauerwas observes that "our normal reading of I Corinthians 12:12-25 as a 'meta-
phor' is a mistake. lt is not as if the dlllrch is, like the body, interconnected, needing all its 
parts even the inferior one. The church is the body from which we learn to understand out 
particular bodies." See his "The Sanctified Body: Why Perfection Does Not Require a 'Self'," 
in SallclifiJ The11r in the Truth (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1998), 82. For recent helpful exegesis 
on the non metaphorical use of "body" in the Corinthian correspondence, see Dale B. Martin, 
The Corinthia11 Body (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995). 
3Millard J. Erickson, Introducing Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1992), 
265, emphasis added. 
4Erickson, Introducing Christian Doctrine, 268, emphasis added. 
---
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I take Erickson's views as symptomatic of a broader pattern of individualism 219 
in contemporary theological conversations. I suspect that we are so thoroughly 
steeped in individualism that we have great difficulty even imagining what 
pneumatology could be about if not about the empowerment of the individual. Yet 
consider an alternative reading of the biblical record. 
When Jesus was questioned by the Pharisees as to the details of the coming 
kingdom, he responded with the words, "The Kingdom of God is ... within you." 
Or did he say, rather, "in your m.idst"?5 We rightly object on theological grounds 
that the kingdom ever be considered "within you," since Jesus' original audience 
included, among others, his nemeses tl1e Pharisees. Rather, Jesus seems to be inti-
mating that he himself was the embodiment of the kingdom who stood in the midst 
of the those who interrogated him. Unfortunately; tlus reading strategy appears to 
be an exception to our more general exegetical practice. What I find most puzzling 
is the instinctive way we assume that phrases such as evto<; Uf..l&V or t:v Uf..ltV ought 
to be translated as "within each of you" rather than "in the midst of you all." For 
example, the NASB translates Romans 8:9 as, " ... you are not in tl1e flesh but in tl1e 
Spirit, if indeed the Spirit of God dwells in you." Here again the Greek pronouns 
are plural-as they nearly always are-and therefore, the text is probably better 
rendered in the plural: "you all are not in the flesh but in the Spirit if indeed the 
Spirit of God dwells in the midst of you all." 
I am not denying that the Spirit indwells and fills individuals. Peter, after all, 
was full of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost. What I am questioning is whether in 
the long run the notion of "individual filling" makes any sense at all when treated 
in isolation from the commtmal form of life that is conceptually linked with the 
corporate filling of the Spirit. 
Consider Paul's letter to the Ephesians. Believers typically turn to 5:18 as the 
locus c/assiws for individualized Spirit-filling. However, note tl1at the notion of Spirit-
filling there is qualified by five participles, the first and last of which-namely speak-
ing and subjecting-are especially bound up with intracommw1alliving. Appar-
ently, believers cannot be filled with the Spirit apart from speaking and acting in a 
certain mmmer toward others.6 Moreover, the object of Paul's address is plural: "Be 
you all filled with the Spirit." Since tlus is a corporate command, are we not obli-
gated on textual grounds at least to entertain the possibility that the content of the 
action envisioned is likewise corporate in nature? After all, Paul rarely concerns 
himself with "new persons" but with a singular "new person." Recent New Testa-
ment scholarship confirms fuat the Pauline "new person" in Ephesians is not a new 
nature internal to each regenerate individual, but a new corporate personality spelled 
out most clearly in chapter 2: Christ himself is the commtmal peace having made 
5Luke 17:21. 
6Qne might respond that the Spirit's filling of an individual is logically prior to changes in 
behavior and speech. Yet is this the emphasis of the text? It seems to me that the text assumes 
that filling ru1d acting are internally related, two sides of the same coin, neither of which can 
be rendered logica lly (nor chronologically) prior to the other. 
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220 out of both groups-Jews and Gentiles-one new corporate person (i!vo. KO.tvov 
O.vepwnov). The reality of this new entity has radical implications for the individual. 
An individual does not possess identity solely on the basis of his or her difference 
from others but on the basis of his or her connection with them. Thus, believers are 
each members of one another (4:25) by virtue of the new reality, the church, which 
Paul identifies as Jesus' "body, the fullness of Him who fills all in all" (1:23).7 As a 
whole, this body constitutes the temple of God's Spirit who indwells-not the bricks-
but the building as a whole (1:21, 22). 
Similar lines of reasoning might be teased out of other Pauline passages. For 
example, Luke Timothy Johnson argues helpfully that Paul's concept of practical 
wisdom (prudence-Q>pov£tv and its cognates) demands that we see pneumatology 
as internally related to Christian moral behavior within the believing commu.nity8 
Likewise, Richard Hays, commenting on Romans 12, writes, 
the primary sphere of moral concern is not the character of the individual, but the corporate 
obedience of the church. Paul's formulation in Romans 12:1-2 encapsulates the vision: "Present 
your bodies (s0111nfn, plural) as a living sacrifice (thysinu, singular) holy and well pleasing to 
God . And do not be conformed to this age, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind 
. .. "The commu nity, in its corporate life, is ca lled to embody an alternative order that stands 
as a sign of God's redemptive purposes in the wo rld 9 
This emphasis on the corpora te presence of the Spirit makes sense out of the 
earlies t apologists' employment of descriptions of the believing corrununity in or-
der to trump all objections raised against Christianity. Consider a concrete example 
excerpted from the pages of a second century apology written by Aristides to Cae-
sar Hadrian, 
But the Christians .. . show ki ndness to those ncar them; and whenever they are judges, they 
judge uprightly .. . they do good to their enemies .. . if one of them have bondsmen and 
bondswomcn or children, through love towa rds them they persuad e them to become Chris-
tians, and when they have done so, they ca ll them brethren without distinction. They do not 
worship strange gods, and they go their way in all modesty and cheerfulness. Fa lsehood is 
7NASV. Perhaps the phrase 1:0 nA.Jipw!la 1:0\l 1:a navta i:v miow nA.!]pOWLEvou might be illumi-
nated by the paraplu·ase: " the one filling each by virtue of fiiJin g all." 
BLuke Timothy Johnson, "Transformation of the Mind and Moral Behavior in Pau l" (paper 
presented at the AAR, San Francisco, CA, 1997). 
9Richard B. Hays, "Ecclesiology and Ethics in I Corin thians," Ex A udit1110 (1994): 33. A third 
exa mple of su pporting biblical scholarship ca n be found in Dale Martin's recent The Corinthian 
Body. Martin claims to have uncovered a more compl ica ted understanding held by ea rly Chris-
tians regarding the relation between ind ividual believers and the believ ing community than 
is typically expressed within contemporary theology. Rather than construe the community as 
constituted by its members, first-century believers likely considered their individuality as 
constituted by the Body of Christ. See Dale B. Martin, The Coriuthin11 Body (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1995). For a theological-ethica l appropriation of this concept 
by Stanley I-lauerwas, see "What Could It Mea n for the Church to Be Christ's Body? A Ques-
tion without a Clea r Answer," in /11 Good Co111pn11y: The Church ns Polis (Notre Dame, IN: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1994/1995), 19-32. 
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not found among them; and they love one another ... And he, who has, gives to him who has 221 
not, without boasting. And when they sec a sh·anger, they take him in to their own homes 
and rejoice over him as a very brother ... And if they hear that one of their number is impris-
oned or afflicted on account of the name of their Messiah, all of them anxiously minister to 
his necessity ... And if there is any among them that is poor and needy, and they have no 
spare food, they fast two or three days in order to supply to the needy their lack of food ... 
Such, 0 King ... is their mrumer of life ... And verily, this is a new people, and tl1ere is something 
divine in the midst ofthem. 10 
Apparently, Aristides felt that he could not speak intelligibly of the Spirit's pres-
ence without preceding this tmdefined notion with several pages of text describing 
the manner in which Christians lived with each other. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein may shed some light here: "the wotds you utter or what 
you think as you utter them are not what matters, so much as the difference they 
make at various points in your life .. . Practice gives the words their sense."'' If I 
read Wittgenstein correctly, the pair of statements "Behold, how they love one an-
other!" and "God is among them" are not descriptions of two states of affairs that 
stand in causal relation to each other; they are two sides of the same coin. The cash 
value of talk about divine presence is precisely that of talk about a Christlike man-
ner of living. We are only fooling ourselves (not to mention attempting to fool out-
siders) when we maintain in the absence of concrete practical differences between 
our community and others' that, nevertheless, talk about the Spirit's presence must 
mean "something." No. If our theology is to resonate with the New Testament and 
second century apologists, we must grow1d our pneuma to logical statements in con-
crete descriptions of commw1ity life. 
To sum thus far, the earliest Christ-followers moved effortlessly between de-
scriptions of community life and descriptions of the Spirit's presence precisely be-
cause they understood these descriptions to be internally related. Just as faith was 
embodied in action, so too the Spirit's presence was embodied in the hurly-burly of 
the christomorphic community. Perhaps our fluency in this earlier, richer, biblical 
language of the Spirit's corporate presence has atrophied, while our modern pen-
chant to construe fundamental spiritual realities in primarily individualistic terms 
has grown overly strong. Speculation as to why or when this fluency was lost is 
outside the scope of this paper. However, I suggest that recent discussions in phi-
losophy of mind and philosophy of science may provide us with conceptual re-
sources for enriching our language once more. It is to a summary of these discus-
sions that I turn next. 
lDAristides, "The Apology of Aristides the Philosopher," in The Ante-Nicene Fathers (First Se-
ries). Original Supplement to the American Edition, Volume 10, ed. Allan Menzies (Grand Rap-
ids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1965), 276-278. Emphasis added. 
IILudwig Wittgenstein, Culture nnd Value, ed. G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. 
Peter Winch, English translation with the amended 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 
1980), 85e. 
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Metaphysical holism names the school of thought that resists the modern urgl:' 
to explain complex wholes simply in terms of their parts . Molecules, holists aver, 
are more than the sum of their constitutive atoms; human beings are more than t]1'\' 
collection of their respective cells; communities are more than the aggregation Of 
their members. Since the nineteenth century, this resistance has taken two forms.ltt 
the case of "emergentism," something real is thought to emerge when a systel1\ 
reaches a certain level of complexity giving the emergent reality (the whole) real 
downward influence over its members. In the case of "nonreductive physicalisrn,'' 
descriptions of the systematic whole are said to supervene in an irreducible way ott 
descriptions of the parts. Both notions, emergence and supervenience, may profit, 
ably illuminate aspects of pneumatology that seem overlooked today. 
Emergence 
Emergentism is a version of metaphysical holism born of nineteenth century 
romanticism. Like the Romantics, emergentists were unhappy with the scientifk 
(which is to say, deterministic) descriptions of the world that seemingly precludeq 
the possibility of real novelty. Unlike the Romantics, emergentists did not th.in.h: 
that real novelty indicated an intrusion into the material world by an immaterial 
property, force, or entity. (Belief in such an invasion is called "vitalism.") Conse-
quently, emergentists tried to retain the spontaneity and creativity of romanticism 
but edged away from the romantic notion of vitalism. 
In his poem "The Metamorphosis of Plants," the Romantic thinker Johann W. 
von Goethe portrays "Life" as an animating force that throbs in the life cycle of 
flowering plants.12 His perception of a perduring vitality enabled Goethe to clas-
sify all the parts of the plant, as well as phases of its life, as different modes of this 
single life force. 1:1 At the turn of the twentieth century, Oswald Spengler applied 
Goethe's romantic vision to an analysis of culture. In Spengler's mind, science in-
evitably describes the world-as-nature in terms of cause-effect pairs that operate on 
the microcosmic scale. But when science tries to think macrocosrnically, it unwit-
tingly assumes that the exp!ana tory power of its theorems depends on the integrity 
of the entire cause-effect chain linking the present with the past. Thus, for example, 
Darwinism must postulate the existence of transitional types between species even 
when evidence for these is lacking. For the same reason, turn-of-the-century scien-
tists tended toward reductionism; even properties as significant as "life" and "free 
will" were thought to be completely explainable by reference to purely physical 
parts in a purely aggregative causal arrangements under the constraints of general 
12}ohann Wolfgang Goethe, "The Metamorphosis of Plants," in The Poems of Goethe (New York: 
Lovell, Coryell, & Co., 1882), 289. 
13M. W. Rowe, "Goethe and Wittgenstein," Philosophy 66 (1991): 283-303. 
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laws of nature. 14 Spengler objected that such a stance necessarily overlooked the 223 
pulsating presence of the life force that alone provides the real unity of what he 
called the world-as-history on the macrocosmic scale. 15 Other roman tics joined 
Spengler in envisioning life as a force that manifested its periodicity through the 
"forms" embodied in living things-even human culture as a whole. In other words, 
not only are individual human beings alive, the species itself has a kind of life cycle, 
and human life as a whole is the progressive actualization of the "form" of human-
ity. Thus, cultures "evolve" in the same way that animal species evolve, namely, by 
the spontaneous emergence of new and unrelated modes of life. Spengler contended that 
this is the only way to make sense out of the historical fact that empires rise and fall 
without transitional types serving as causal links from one empire to another. 16 
In this way, the romantic explanation did what scientific reductionism could 
not do: give prominence to the apparent interconnectedness of all things living. It 
was this explanatory power of romanticism that emergentists sought to preserve-
yet without all the hocus-pocus associated with vitalism. For example, C. Lloyd 
Morgan argued that the steps forward taken by the process of evolution were novel 
and in an important sense discontinuous with any real or imagined causal chain, 
simply because the emergence of new species is a brute fact; no further explanation 
was needed. In terms of cosmogeny, Morgan held that psychophysical events give 
rise to life, which give rise to mind and from which emerges spirit, even deity. 17 
At stake for all emergentist accounts is the distinction made in the nineteenth 
century by J. S. Mill and G. H. Lewes between resultant (sometimes called hereditary 
or mechanistic) forms of causation and emergent (or non mechanistic) forms of causa-
tion. The former refer to the broadly Hurnean view of nomological regularity, while 
the latter signify those that do not succumb to nomological description. 18 
14C. Lloyd Morgan crafted his version of emergent evolution to displace four unacceptable 
and rival explanations: vitalism, mechanism, preformationism or substance dualism, and 
metaphysical reductionism. I have simplified his list for sake of clarity. See T. A. Gouge, "Emer-
gent Evolution," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing & The Free Press, 1965), 2: 472-477. 
150swald Spengler, Decline of the West, 2 vols. (New York: Knopf, [1926-8]1946). 
165pengler, Decline of the West, II: 32-33. 
17Sirnilarly, Samuel Alexander lists five emergent levels: space-time, matter, life, mind, deity. 
Later accounts were more circumspect with respect to deity. For example, Hilary Puh1am and 
Paul Oppenheim first conceived of a "mereological" ontology that began with elementary 
particles whim gave rise to atoms which gave rise to molecules, then cells, multicellular 
organisms, biological individuals, and finally, social groups. See Gouge, "Emergent Evolu-
tion," 2: 475. 
1BSee Achim Stephan, "Emergence-A Systematic View on its Historical Facets," in E111ergence 
or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Non reductive Physicnlis111, eds. Ansgar Beckerman, Has 
Flohr, and Jaegwon Kim (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992), 25-48. See also 
Mario Bunge, Causality; The Place of Causal Principle in Modern Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1959), 17-19, 198-219. Bunge himself complains that romanticism is suscep-
tible to an "organismic view of the block universe, in which there is place neither for chance 
nor freedom." On his view, causal determinism "leaves enough holes in the universe to let 
chance work as an ontological category" (116). See also Ernest Sosa, "Varieties of Causation," 
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224 Emergentism enjoyed a brief heyday in the 1920s but fell on tough times with the 
advent of quantum physics. 19 
However, since the late 1970s, there has been a renaissance of emergentism 
occasioned by the inability of reductive physicalists to account adequately for the 
apparent causal power, which, for example, the human mind is commonly sup-
posed to exert over the physical world. As Paul Humphreys notes: 
For if mental properties are causally impotent vis-a-vis physical properties, the traditional 
worry about epiphenomenalism confronts us: What is the point of having them in our ontol-
ogy if they are idle? Abstract objects escape this worry, for we do not expect them to do causal 
work, but mental properties are retained in part because we believe them to affect the course 
of the world. 20 
Emergentism is once again becoming respectable, although today it is commonly 
thought of in connection with the reality of the human mind (vis-a-vis the brain) 
rather than the reality of World spirit or Life force or God. 
The easiest way to begin getting a handle on contemporary emergentism is to 
recall the familiar hierarchy of scientific disciplines. The discipline known as par-
ticle physics is distinct from chemistry precisely because it studies a different class 
of phenomena, namely, those having to do with sub-atomic particles. Chemistry 
cannot be reduced to physics precisely because it studies properties unique to the 
molecular, rather than atomic, level of complexity. Of course, some properties, such 
as mass, nre simply additive. However, other properties can be thought of as dis-
tinctive, unique to a given level of complexity; such are the particular domain of 
that scientific discipline. Thus, stereoisomerism (the study of 3-D structural differ-
ences between molecules with identical constituent parts) at the level of chemistry 
has no analog at the level of physics, because for molecules, but not for sub-atomic 
particles, three-dimensional structure is functionally significant (for example," right-
handed" vs. "left-handed" enzymes). This fact tempts us to say that a new entity is 
being studied at this level of complexity despite the fact that such an entity is made 
up entirely of atoms, which is to say, elements that comprise the next lower ontic 
in Causation, eds. Ernest Sosa and Michael Tooley (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
234-242. 
19See Brian McLaughlin, "The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism," in Emergence or Reduc-
tio11?, 49-93; see also R. E. Tully, "Emergence Revisited," in Pmgrnatisnt a11d Purpose: Essays 
Presented to Thomas A Goudge, eds. L. W. Sumner, John G. Slater, and Fred Wilson (Toronto & 
Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 261-277. Unfortunately for the emergentists, C. D. 
Broad had built his case for emergentism on what classical physics regarded as the "fact" of 
the nonpredictability of chemical properties. However, the advent of quantum mechanics, 
with its surprising successes to predict just such properties, fueled relentless attacks on 
emergentism by very robust physical reductionists. Eventua lly, emergentism died the death 
of a thousand qualifications when Hempel and Oppenheim conceded that in the face of in-
disputable scientific progress, perhaps emergentism was no more than a stop-gap theory-a 
temporary way to talk about matters that would eventually succumb to purely physicalist 
explanation. 
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order. This mereological picture is repeatable. Moving up: molecules constitute cells, 225 
and properties unique to the cellular level emerge giving justification to biologists' 
treatment of cells as "real" in their own right. On this view, the so-called "soft sci-
ences," such as sociology, are seen to lie farther up the same mereological hierarchy 
as the hard sciences. In the case of sociology, human individuals constitute a social 
group, and the social group instantiates properties unique to that group, a fact that 
justifies treating the group as a causal entity in its own right.21 
Many (if not all) emergentists will characterize the relationship between adja-
cent levels in the hierarchy with the several features. 22 The most important of these 
is downward causation: macro-properties have top-down causal influence on the parts 
that constitute the system. Thus, mental events have real causal influence on brain 
states.23 Similarly, as Durkhei.m was the first to discover, social facts (namely, group 
20Pa ul Humphreys, "How Properties Emerge," Philosophy of Science 64 (Mard1 1997): 2. 
21ln addition to Achim Stephan's essay ci ted above, see Brian McLaughlin, "The Rise and Fall 
of British Emergentism," in Emerge11ce or Reduction?, 49-93. See also Arthur R. Peacocke, "Re-
ductionism: A Review of the Epistemological Issues and Their Relevance to Biology and the 
Problem of Consciousness," Zygo11 11, no. 4 (Dec 1976): 307-334. 
While early versions took an ontological cast, contempora ry expressions of emergentism may 
be taken simply as linguistic in form: the concept of emergence is useful for talking about 
properties of systems. This avoids on the one hand, the supposed difficulties inherent in 
unfa lsifiable ontological commitments and, on the other hand, the difficulty of believing that 
each sentence of psyd1ology, for example, can be translated into sentences about physical 
events (a position called semantic physicalism). Ansgar Beckerman summarizes this latter 
problem thus: "Every time we try to explica te the meaning of the mental expression in terms 
of behavioral dispositions we find ourselves in the situation that we cannot formulate the 
cond itions of the disposition except by using other mental expressions." Ansgar Beckerman, 
"Introduction-Reductive and Nonred uctive Physicalism," in Emerge11ce or Reductio11?, 6. 
22See Stephan, 27-45; McLaughlin, 48-52. There are five features generally mentioned in addi-
tion to downward causation. First, nonadditivity: the whole is greater than the arithmetic 
sum of its parts because new properties (perhaps even new entities?) emerge that make each 
level of complexity "discontinuous" with the level of its constituen t parts. Mario Bw1ge de-
fines emergence this way: "Let P be a property of a complex thing x other than the composi-
tion of x. Then (i) Pis res11ltn11t or hereditary if P is a property of some components of x; (ii) 
otherwise, that is, if no component of x possesses P, Pis emergent, collective, systemic or gestalt" 
(cited in Stephan, 31). Second, novelty: emergent properties are a function of the complex 
and are not instantiated at the level of the parts. For example, there is no analog to wetness 
for an isolated HzO molecule. Third, nonpredictability: neither the laws whid1 describe the 
emergent property nor the laws which describe the regularity of the transition between lev-
els arc deterministic (in the Laplacean sense). This leaves us necessarily unable to discover or 
predict these laws prior to empirical observation of the complex. Fourth, nondeducibility: 
because one set of base conditions can give rise to a variety of complexes, and, beca use two or 
more distinct base conditions ca n realize the "same" emergent property, the emergent prop-
erty ca nnot be thou ght of as deducible. Fifth, radical epistemological contingency: beca use 
emergent properties are nonded ucib le and non predictable, we must face the necessarily in-
complete state of human knowing. ln a recent essay Paul Humphreys notes that once we 
construe the world in terms of levels we open ourselves to the wrongheaded question, "Which 
level is more basic than the others?" Of course this question is simply another version of the 
reductionism that emergentis ts want to disabuse u of. Consequently, Humphreys argues 
that we ought to aba ndon the levels model al.togethcr. See Paul Humphreys, "Emergence, 
----
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226 properties such as belonging to a Protestant Church) predisposes individuals in 
this group toward certain behaviors (in this instance, toward suicide).24 
A Conceptual Assist from Emergentism 
Despite 0ur strong tendency to consider the status of the individual as more 
fundamental to the workings and identity of the community than the other way 
around, the language of emergence may give us a way to w1derstand the dynamic 
relation in which believers stand to the whole: the Body of Christ emerges from the 
system of individuals that embodies a particular form of life. 
Saying that the Body of Christ emerges from a group of believers whose matrix 
of relations is configured in the imitatio Christi has the advantage of emphasizing 
the fact that the faithful commw'lity is itself crucial to both the salvation and sancti-
fication of the individual. Augustine's dictum, "Outside the church there is no sal-
vation" (ad extra ecclesiam nulla sa /us), does not make some sort of good work (for 
example, church membership) a prerequisite for salvation. It simply states a fact-
the individual who neglects participation in the new relational configuration that 
constitutes the Body of Christ stands outside that which is being saved. 
Similarly, an emergentist outlook opens the possibility of top-down influences 
by the commw'lity upon the individual members in ways that transcend spiritual 
disciplines undertaken on the individual level (such as prayer, Bible reading, fast-
ing, etc.).25 Negatively stated, the spiritual poverty of the believing community 
places, in an important sense, an unavoidable upper limit to the spiritual health of 
the individual and beyond which ceiling no member can rise despite a host of iso-
lated efforts on his or her part.26 Positively stated, the emergent social reality, the 
Body of Christ, may exercise top-down persuasiveness on those outsiders that come 
within range of its language and life, by showing at the corporate level what simply 
Not Supervenience," Philosophy of Science 64 (Proceedings) (March 1997): S337-S345. See also 
his essay, "Understanding the Not-So-Special Sciences," Southern joumal of Philosophy 34 
(Supplement. Spindel Conference 1995) (March 1995): 99-114. 
23For a neuroscientific defense of downward causation see the works of R.W. Sperry such as 
"Discussion: Macro- Versus Micro-determinism," Philosopl1y of Scie11ce 53 (1986): 265-270. For 
a neurobiological ex~mple see Josie Gla usiusz, "The Chemistry of Obsession," Discover, ]Lme 
1996, 36. For a philosophical defense see Paul Humphreys, "How Properties Emerge" and 
"Emergence, Not Supervenience." For biochemical explanation and defense see ArthW' R. 
Peacocke, The Physical Chemistry of Biological Organization (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1983). 
24Daniel Little, Varieties of Social Expla11alio11: An Jntroduclio11 to tile Philosophy of Social Scie11ce 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 189-190. 
250f course, the opposite scenario is also possible: a deficiency in the form of intra-communal 
life exercises a negative top-down influence on its parts. (Surely we call this a dead church.) 
261 Cor. 12:26 says that the suffering of the one, in fact (note the indicative verb, crwmacrxet), 
entails the suffering of the whole. The text does not limit the sort of suffering that is distrib-
uted throughout the Body merely to physical or emotional loss. Rather, the point is that be-
lievers are mystically-or mereologically-connected within the Body and thus the spiritual 
health of each is bound up with the spiritual health of the other and of the whole. 
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cannot be snid on the level of the individual. We have already witnessed Aristides' 227 
apologetic strategy of appealing to the remarkable shape of life in the believing 
community. A similar example can be f01.md in another second century apologist. 
In Athenagoras's mind, truthful description of the Christian community always 
trumps any and all objections raised against the gospel: 
But among us you will find w1educated persons and artisans, and old women who, if they 
are unable in words to prove the benefit of our doctrine, yet by their deeds exhibit the benefit 
arising from their persuasion of its truth: they do not rehearse speeches, but exhibit good 
works; when struck, they do not strike again; when robbed, they do not go to law; they give 
of those who ask of them, and love their neighbors as themselves.27 
Such a strategy is fully commensurate with the Scripture's insistence that the church 
is the "pillar and bulwark of the truth," rather than the other way around.28 
The concept of emergence affords the first part of an enriched pneumatology. 
If community life is an emergent property that cannot be reduced to the sum of 
properties manifested by the parts (in this case, the members of the body), and if 
community life has real downward causal power over its constitutive members, 
then we are obligated to look at community life tmder an aspect different than that 
of merely an aggregative description of individual actions; there is a patternedness 
and reality to the whole that must itself display Christlikeness if we are to intelligi-
bly say that the Spirit is present among us . 
Supervenience 
In addition to claiming that the Body of Christ is an irreducible social reality 
that must figure prominently in Christian pneumatology, a second conceptual as-
sist forpneumatology can be found in the notion of "supervenience." The nature of 
theological language is such that descriptions of the divine presence carmot simply 
hang in space; theological descriptions mean something only when framed by par-
ticular linguistic practices within a determinate form of life. I claim, in particular, 
that descriptions of the Spirit's presence supervene upon descriptions of the believ-
ing community's form of life. In order to unpack the significance of this claim, I 
must recount a little history. 
If emergentism began with romanticism and edged away from vitalism to-
ward a moderate center, supervenience began at the other extreme, witl1 physical-
ism, and moved toward the center by edging away from reductionism. The term 
was first used by Richard Hare to describe G. E. Moore's contention that a pattern 
of human behavior in the physical world can be given a m.oral description; moral 
properties car1 be thought to "depend" on physical properties, yet without being 
27L. Russ Bush, ed., Classical Readings in Christin11 Apologetics A.D. 100-1800 (Grand Rapids, 
Ml: Academie Books, Zondervan Pub lishing House, 1983), 44. 
281 Tim. 3:15 NEB. 
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228 reduced to these.29 For example, we might naturally say: "Mother Teresa gave her 
life serving the poor in Calcutta. This is morally good." Did Mother Teresa's moral 
property of goodness cause her to behave in ways that she did? Or did her behaving 
in such-and-such ways cause her to gain a property called moral goodness? Here, 
causal questions are wrongheaded. Rather, we have two ways of describing Mother 
Teresa: 
a. Mother Teresa gave her life serving the poor in Calcutta. (Physical) 
b. Mother Teresa is morally good. (Moral) 
Now the question becomes "what is the relationship between these two de-
scriptions? Clearly, we cannot say that the second is entirely independent of the 
first. Rather, the second in some sense "depends on" the first for its meaning and 
veracity. (If Mother Teresa had lived her life in wanton greed and self-service, it 
would not dawn on us even to describe her as morally good.) Moreover, we cannot 
speak of this dependence as if it were an entirely accidental feature of this present 
social world. We say instead that the "dependence" between the two above clain1s 
is strong enough to warrant the assertion that caring for the poor in a manner that 
resembles Mother Teresa is always morally commendable-on this or any other con-
ceivable planet. 
The notion of supervenience was originally employed to do this job: moral 
descriptions supervene on descriptions of physical behavior. However, today the 
term "supervenience" appears most frequently in discussions surr01mding the mind-
body problem. It was in this context that Donald Davidson resurrected Hare's term 
in his own 1970 lecture "Mental Events."30 Davidson explains that mental event 
language supervenes upon descriptions of physical events. This means simply "that 
there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but different in some men-
tal respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in 
some physical respect."31 
The central concern appears to be the nature of the relation between mental 
properties and physical properties. Is the connection law-like? If so, is this nomo-
logical regularity due to a mechanistic connection from physical events (brain states) 
to mental ones? If the connection is causal in the ordinary sense, then mental events 
reduce to physical events; determinism follows. However, Davidson avoids reduc-
tionism by denying that the connection between the physical and the mental is 
law-like, hence predictable and deterministic. By "supervenience," he is raising the 
29For a brief history of the concept see Jaegwon Kim, "Concepts of Superven ience," in S11per-
ve11ience a11d Mind, 53-78. 
30Davidson's 1970 landmark essay, "Mental Events" is reprinted in Essays 011 Aclions and Events 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1980), 207-225. Davidson's position is most vigorously 
explicated (and consequently opposed) by Jaegwon Kim. See his S11perve11ie11ce a11d Mind: 
Selected P!Jilosophicnl Essays (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
31Cited in Ansgar Beckerman, "Introduction- Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism," 11. 
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possibility of a nomnechanical "because of" in the following sentence: "individuals 229 
have their mental properties because of their physical properties."32 
But notice what else Davidson is doing by employing the concept of "superve-
nience": he is framing the discussion in linguistic rather than ontological terms. As 
in the case of Mother Teresa, at stake is not the direction of causation-whether her 
goodness causes her behavior or vice versa-but rather the nature of the relation-
ship between two complementary descriptions. Similarly here: at stake is not whether 
mental events cause brain states or vice versa, but whether the notions of "mind" 
and "brain" are in some sense complementary and interdependent descriptions of 
human experience. In other words, we must speak of both mental events (for ex-
ample, intentionality) and brain states (for example, synapse firing) to give a com-
plete description of the events that comprise our lives. 
32It is important at this juncture to understand what Davidson is not saying. Davidson has 
drawn fire from Jaegwon Kim for utilizing supervenience to defend the reality of both men-
tality and physicality without envisioning a nomological connection between the two. See 
Beckerman, "Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction"; Jaegwon Kim, "The 
Nonreductivist's Troubles with Mental Causation," in Superveniencecmd Mind, 336-357, "Mul-
tiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction," in Supervenience and Mind, 309-335, and 
'"Downward Causation' in Emergentism and Nomeductive Physicalism," in Emergence or 
Reduction?, 119-137. Kim parodies nonreductive physicalists as supposing that "To be real is 
to have causal power" (Kim, "Downward Causation," 135). In Kim's view, Davidson, eta/, 
"accord full ontological status to emergent properties: not only are they real and genuine 
properties of things in the world, in the same se11se in which basic physicoche111icnl properties nre 
real, but in some ways they are richer and fuller features of the things they characterize" 
(Kim, "Downward Causation," 134; emphasis added). Kim fears that nonreductive physical-
ists are claiming that mental states do work not done by physical states. This zero-sum game 
evidences Kin1's confusion: to say that mental causation works to tile exclusion of physical 
causation is the very category fallacy that supervenience seeks to overcome.! suspect that for 
Kim the phrase 'mental event' refers to something out there in the real world in a manner no 
different than the phrase 'physical event' refers. Given this outlook, Kim must object to 
Davidson or else surrender his own physicalist ontology.However, Davidson does not con-
ceive the world as one thing and language as another. (For a discussion of Davidson's views 
of language see my "The Gospel Truth of Relativism," in Tile Scottish Journal of Theology 53, no. 
2, (2000):177-211). FoUowing Wittgenstein, Davidson views language as constituting, or be-
ing internally related to, the human world. Thus, Davidson is free to speak of "reality" in a 
variety of language games and also to ask the question of the relationship between the lan-
guage game of mental events and the language game of brain states. The real issue for 
nonreductive physicalists is not a consideration of the relation between properties or entities 
as Kim wrongly imagines. Rather, it is a question of the relation between descriptions. Does 
this mean that for Davidson the only difference between mental events and brain states is a 
"linguistic" one? Wrong question-for that way of putting the objection only has bite for 
someone who holds that language corresponds to reality or that language is somehow 
ontologicnlly inferior to "reality" in the same way that a photo of me is ontologica lly inferior to 
me. 
- I 
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230 A Conceptual Assist from Supervenience 
Now we are in position to see how the concept of "supervenience" might en-
rich current pneumatology, especially by helping us overcome our contemporary 
penchant to speak of the Spirit's presence in purely individualistic terms. In par-
ticular, I suggest that descriptions of the Holy Spirit's presence are of the same sort 
as moral claims: they supervene on descriptions of the communal form of life. 
In one sense, my appropriation of the language of supervenience (and emer-
gence) may simply be another way of making what Wittgenstein called a "gram-
matical point." For example, the word "chair" gets a grip in our lives via our mul-
tiple activities involving chairs.33 A "grammatical" mistake in this case would be 
expressed by the question, "Is this chair intelligent?" A grammatical remark, then, 
is simply a statement that points out that the ways in which we ordinarily use the 
word "chair" disallow our speaking of a chair's intelligence. So too, ordinary lan-
guage prevents us from inquiring about the honesty of the letter "e" or the wetness 
of social justice. In the case of pneumatology, the grammatical remark I am trying 
to make is that talk of the Spirit's presence may be vacuous unless associated with 
a particular shape of community life. What do claims about the Spirit's presence 
amount to if not the way believers live with each other? 
Please do not mistake what I have tried to say. Discussions of emergentism 
and supervenience might be easily and naturally associated with process theology. 
However, process thinkers (as well as other versions of panentheism) make onto-
logical claims about the nature of the divine substance that supposedly enables 
God to interact with the physical world. In contrast, I am not making an ontological 
claim about the divine substance. I am not saying God supervenes upon the com-
munity. I am saying that descriptions of God's presence supervene upon descriptions 
of the believing community's form of life. In other words, claims such as "God is 
here" have determinative meaning if and only if a communal form of life is expli-
cated in the same context. 
Why the communal form of life and not that of the individual? Because the 
meaningfuh1ess of language depends on the linguistic practices of a community. If 
Wittgenstein can be trusted, a sentence's meaning is not some occult thing that 
rides piggyback on a striJ g of ocables. Rather, what we call a sentence's meaning 
is the use to which it is put within the context of a community's form of life. Thus, 
to understand a sentence requires us to look for how the speaking of a given sen-
tence meshes with the rest of life. For example, people are bound to misunderstand 
claims about God's forgiveness if these are spoken against a backdrop of a commu-
nity that fails to practice forgiveness. 34 The practice of forgiveness in community 
33Wittgenstein wrote, "It is part of the grammar of the word 'chair' that this is what we call 'to 
sit on a chair'." The Blue and Browu Books (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 24. 
34Mk. 11:25, Mt. 6:16. 
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becomes the form of life upon which intelligibility of statements about divine for- 231 
giveness hinges. 
Irenaeus hinted at what I call the supervenience of the description of the di-
vine presence upon descriptions of the form of communal life when he rejected 
Gnostic claims of direct knowledge of God (that is, knowledge unmediated by any 
social life). Rather, God and nature (physis) are categorically different. We are un-
able to know God in se, but we come to know God via the image of God stamped in 
various media-namely, Jesus and the believing community. What Irenaeus identi-
fied as the "image" of God, then, was the pattern of relationality: the primary pat-
tern was the relationship of Jesus with the Father that became embodied in the 
Gospel story; secondarily, the pattern of the intra-trinitarian relationality was re-
produced in the Christian community as mutual humility, service, and kenosis. 
Thus, while God cannot be known in se, for God is wholly other, the configuration 
of this relationality can be described, or better, shown, by the narrative of Jesus and 
by the story of historical Christian communities.35 Is not the character of God thought 
to be revealed by the way his worshippers sold themselves into slavery to feed the 
poor?36 In Irenaeus's mind, the telos of human existence is salvation, which on his 
account is nothing less than the realizing of God's likeness in the realm of human 
community.37 
Some may object that my suggestions have mortgaged the farm; my use of 
supervenience (in particular) appears to outlaw certain ontological commitments 
we hold regarding God. Who can imagine a less satisfying trade than a God who 
"does stuff' and to whom we are "personally related" for a set of mere grammatical 
points? Fortunately, this dilemma is artificial. 
Grammatical remarks gesture toward the real. On the one hand, attention to 
the grammar of the conceptual language that believers speak prevents the "refuta-
tion" of their claims as if they were empirical propositions.38 On the other hand, 
grammatical points have the power they do because they reflect a "realism without 
empiricism."39 The speaking of the Christian language within the context of the 
believing community creates and fu lfills the conditions for its own reality: a whole 
35My exegesis of this point is indebted to Rowan Williams who cites lrenaeus with commen-
tary, "For when the word of God was made flesh, He established both these things: He showed 
us the true image [of God in hwnanity] by Himself becoming what was in fact His own 
image; and He established and restored the likeness [of humanity to God] by making human-
ity resemble the invisible Father by means of [His action as] the visible Word." Rowan Will-
iams, The Wound of Knowledge, 2d rev. ed. (Boston, MA: Cowley P ublications, 1990), 29. 
361 Clement 55:2. 
37Wi lliams, The Wound of Knowledge, 30. Of course, the narrative ofJesus belonged to, and was 
the crucial part of, the longer OT narrative of Judaism wh ich gnosticism explicitly rejected. 
38Thls is precisely the sort of advantage logical po itivists had over turn-of-the-century fun-
damentalists. See Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism nnd Fundnmenlnlisn1 (Philadelphia, PA: 
Trinity Press International, 1996), 36-61. 
39See Brad J. Kallen berg, "Changing the Subject in Postmodernity: Narrative Ethics and Philo-
sophical Therapy in the Works of Stanley Hauerwas and Ludwig Wittgenstein" (Ph . D. Dis-
sertation, Fuller Theological Seminary, 1998), 377-387. 
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232 new world (mtv~ nicnc;-2 Cor. 5:17) is created for the community that speaks and 
lives thus. Such a linguistic community is itself an emergent reality that gathers up 
others into a mode of speaking that is itself partly constitutive of the praxis which 
gives sense to its language. In Johannes Fisher's words, "There is a kind of knowl-
edge which is practical in the sense that it does not just state reality but rather first 
of all places the perceiving agent into this very reality."40 Within the form of life 
that believers inhabit by grace, they are entitled to robust ontological commitments-
namely, beliefs in the reality of God's Spirit, of the con'lffitmity, and of oneself. Bridge 
builders calculate wave functions and rely on the "reality" of imaginary(!) numbers 
to tell them which bridges won't spontaniously collapse. Surely religious believers 
are as justified in their commitment to the reality of God's Spirit.'11 
An important consequence of a linguistically sensitive pneumatology is the 
fact that no clear boundaries need to be drawn between the realm and role of God 
and that of human believers. Reinhard Hutter urges that we tmderstand this com-
plicated form of life under the double aspect of paraclesis (exhortation). In other 
words, the Apostle's words "You are the body of Christ!" (1 Cor. 12:12) is both a 
promise and a claim. Unfortw1ately, we typically dichotomize God's activity and 
human activity such that we take the "indicative" as a reference to "God's already 
accomplished activity," while taking the "imperative" to name our human activity. 
In contrast, Hutter explains that "paradesis thematizes God in the presence and 
activity of the parae/etas, the third person of the Trinity, in such a way that our activ-
ity is transformed and, at its very best, only joins the Spirit's activity."42 In this sort of 
pneumatology, the distinction between God's activity in the midst of our commu-
nity and the communal life itself begins to be blurred in a way that rivals the mys-
tery of the trinity. 
Conclusion 
I think that the notions of emergence and supervenience may prove useful to 
discussions of the Spirit's presence in commt.mity on several counts. Most obvi-
ously, these two concepts enable us to avoid the language of" causality" and thereby 
"
0Cited in Reinhard Hutter, "Ecclesial Ethics, the Church's Vocation and Paraclesis," Pro Ecc/esin 
2 (fall1993}: 446. 
"'W. V. 0. Quine defended augmenting ontology-with gods, irrational numbers, physical 
objects, and other "myths"-in order to "simplify our treatment of experience." See "Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism," The Philosophical Review 60, no. 1 (1951}: 41-42. Daniel Bonevac has 
shown that ontological commitments remain intact for speakers of language governed by 
supervenient relationships. Only some form of "ontological supervenienc "could eliminate 
other ontological commitments, and then only do so by implementing some presupposed 
background theory. See Daniel Bonevac, "Reduction in the Mind of God," in Supervenience: 
New Essays, ed. Elias E. Savellos and Omit D. Yalc;in (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 133-134. 
12Hi.itter, "Ecclesial Ethics, the Church's Vocation and Paraclesis," 443. 
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escape the sorts of confusions so typically prominent in discussions of divine ac- 233 
tion.43 
Second, this language gives us a way to formulate our beliefs more in keeping 
with the historical position of the church. As Clark Pinnock notes, for 1,500 years 
the church worshipped God sacramentally by conceiving of a physical side to the 
spiritual and a spiritual side to the physical in a way that avoided matter-spirit 
dualism.44 They conceived the spiritual and the physical as flowing together, pro-
viding them with a robust understanding of God's presence in the sacrament. So 
too, Calvin and Luther insisted that God's presence in the Eucharist was more than 
mere symbolism. Since Descartes, their views have been considered by some to be 
philosophically embarrassing. Yet the notions of supervenience and emergence may 
give us a respectable way to reclaim our heritage by showing a way to avoid di-
chotomizing the physical and the spiritual, on the one hand, and to w1derstand, on 
the other hand, that the material and formal conditions for speaking about the Spirit's 
presence are broader than mere ritual-they encompass the entire form of commu-
nal life. 
To say the same thing differently, the notions of emergence and supervenience 
are but reminders of the close connection between how believers speak (theology) 
and how the church lives (practice). In particular, emergence teaches us that the 
whole is real and deserving of attention if we are to "attain ... to a [corporate] 
mature man, to the measure of the stature which belongs to the full1ess ofChrist."45 
Supervenience underscores this lesson by reminding us that concrete theological 
claims are vacuous unless spoken within arm's length of the community that incar-
nates, however imperfectly, the story of Jesus. 
Finally, the notions of emergence and supervenience give us a way to say what 
we have wanted to say all along: the Spirit of God is present "where two or three 
are gathered" in a manner that the Spirit is not present with an individual believer.'16 
43Th us, 1 am no/ saying that God's presence supervenes upon a certain co1mnw1al form of 
life--that is tantamount to pantheism. In my estimation this is exactly the error that Dennis 
Biefeldt makes in his article, "God, Physicalism, and Supervenience," The Center for Theology 
and the Nat11ml Sciences 15, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 1-12. Likewise, Martin Buber insisted that 
relationality is logically prior to existence but because of his w1itarian view of God, he saw 
divine relationality as external to God and was therefore forced to conclude that "emergence" 
expressed a reciproca l dependence between Creator and creation. See I ar1d Thou, a New Trans-
lation with a Prologue "I and You" and Notes by Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann 
(New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 130-132. 
Rather, I am saying that the descriptio11s of God's presence supervene on the description of a 
Christomorphic form of comrmmity life; that's the best that we can do. Although I've focused 
attention on Davidson in this essay, perhaps R. M. Hare's original usage is closer to what I 
mean to employ. 
"Pinnock, Flame of Love, 113-147. 
45Eph. 4:13 (NASB). 
46lt is important to note that Mt. 18:20 begins (postpositively) with gar, thus identifying God's 
presence with the communal actions of binding and loosing discussed in vv. 18-19. 
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